Profiting From Proliferation?

The September 2023 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un raised concerns over the possibility that Pyongyang may supply Moscow with arms to support its war of aggression in Ukraine. Subsequent reports of North Korean transfers of ammunition to Russia and unconfirmed intelligence of suspected ballistic missiles transfers solidified those concerns. While the fact of Russia – host to one of the world’s most capable military–industrial complexes – turning to North Korea for arms was shocking, it did not come as a surprise to those familiar with the latter’s long history of arms trading and missile proliferation activities.

North Korea has exported missile technology since the 1980s and has, on several occasions, also transferred technology directly relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. Despite the introduction since 2006 of a progressively extensive sanctions regime against North Korea and its proliferation activity by the UN Security Council (UNSC), North Korean exports of missile and nuclear technology have persisted. Considering developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities in recent years, the range of technologies that Pyongyang may be able to offer potential customers has also expanded. These technological advances, combined with the expansion of the UNSC sanctions regime over the past two decades, as well as other recent developments – like North Korea’s apparently expanding military collaboration with Russia, Moscow’s increasing disregard for UN sanctions, and North Korea’s reopening after the Covid-19 pandemic – make a reassessment of North Korea’s missile and nuclear exports timely.

This paper builds on existing literature on North Korea’s missile and nuclear proliferation, supplementing it with expert interviews and leveraging the emergence of new information and cases related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities and transfers over the past decade. The authors consider the potential for future missile and nuclear sales by Pyongyang, asking: how likely is North Korea to sell its missile and nuclear technology onwards, what technology may be for sale, and to whom? With a growing technological offering and a continuing need to generate hard currency, incentives for North Korea to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to foreign customers persist. As well as North Korea’s more novel technologies potentially being for sale, Pyongyang’s technological progress may also have created surpluses of older technology which it may be looking to sell off.

However, despite clear supply-side drivers, there are a range of restraining factors that are likely to prevent an all-out onward proliferation bonanza emanating from North Korea. A variety of factors have whittled down the potential markets for these technologies, while the restrictive sanctions landscape and unprecedented monitoring of the Korean peninsula have also worked to reduce opportunities for sales and increase the risks posed by interdiction. North Korean concerns over the possibility of its more advanced capabilities falling into adversary hands, thus potentially putting its own deterrent at risk, are also likely to temper its willingness to export such capabilities, despite the potentially high price tag that could be attached to them.

The changing geopolitical landscape resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may, however, open new opportunities for North Korea. Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea could give other countries the green light to accept North Korean arms, missiles and perhaps even nuclear technology. There remains a real risk of a broader collapse of the UNSC sanctions regime and the resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.

Building on the analysis of North Korea’s expanded technological offering, reduced customer base and other factors affecting export decisions – and the clear need to pay attention to the issue – this paper presents 10 recommendations to help in countering North Korean missile and nuclear technology proliferation. These recommendations are organised in two categories, which attempt to address the supply side of the problem – deterring, dissuading and encouraging North Korea to refrain from engaging in onward proliferation – as well as demand-side factors – by trying to reduce North Korea’s customer base.

Introduction

In September 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un travelled by armoured train to Russia’s far east to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kim’s visits to the Vostochny Cosmodrome and a fighter jet factory in Komsomolsk-on-Amur further raised existing concerns that the two countries were seeking to exchange military technology. Indeed, recent research has confirmed that hundreds of shipping containers, likely carrying ammunition, have been moved from North Korea to Russian military bases since the leaders’ meeting. The meeting was preceded two months earlier by the visit of Russian and Chinese delegations to North Korea to mark the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, with officials from Moscow led by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. Russia and North Korea – both countries under extensive international sanctions and with acute military equipment needs – put on a strikingly united front. Notably, Shoigu was treated to a defence exhibition featuring many of North Korea’s newest weapons systems – including UAVs, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and even ICBMs. In November 2023, South Korean intelligence publicly shared its suspicions – otherwise unconfirmed – that North Korea may have already sent SRBMs to Russia.

Pyongyang has long been an exporter of missile and nuclear technology; this has included exports of Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s, Scud SRBMs to a range of customers (largely in the Middle East) through the 1980s and 1990s, as well as nuclear reactor technology to Syria, and uranium hexafluoride gas to Libya in the early 2000s through the proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan (Boxes 1 and 2 summarise North Korea’s historical trade).

North Korea’s exhibition of missiles to Shoigu is far from the only indicator that Pyongyang remains open for business to countries looking to procure missile and even nuclear technology. Reporting by the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 Committee Panel of Experts (PoE) has noted that Pyongyang has engaged in missile cooperation with Iran and Syria as recently as 2020 and 2019, respectively. A 2020 documentary film of unclear veracity entitled The Mole also showed an actor – playing the part of a private arms dealer – venturing to Pyongyang undercover in 2017 and being offered a wide range of short- and even intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). While most of the handful of known nuclear technology transfers by North Korea date back two decades, the last publicly known case of North Korea offering nuclear-weapons-relevant materials on the open market – in that instance, the isotope lithium-6 – was uncovered just six years ago.

North Korea has engaged in these transfers despite an expansive UNSC sanctions regime that prohibits most trade with the country, including a prohibition on trade with the country in missile and nuclear technology, and most types of arms, in place since 2006. Pyongyang’s advancements in its nuclear and missile capabilities have had an impact on what, how and to whom North Korea may sell its nuclear and missile technology in the future. Its experience in identifying customers and engaging in illicit trade under the international sanctions regime over the past two decades will also have influenced its patterns of onward proliferation.

Developments in the international sanctions regime and North Korean missile and nuclear capabilities, as well as changing geopolitical dynamics, necessitate a re-examination of North Korean onward proliferation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has resulted in the widening of existing schisms in the international community, with countries opposing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on one side, and those that have supported Russia or remained ambivalent on the other. Those in the latter camp, which includes North Korea and Iran, appear to have found in Russia a willing trading and diplomatic partner as Moscow seeks to reduce its isolation. This study is thus particularly timely in light of the recent high-level meetings between Pyongyang and Moscow, and the more general apparent expansion of relations between the two countries, as well as other developments – such as the gradual reopening of North Korea’s borders following the Covid-19 pandemic, the expiry in October 2023 of the UN Security Council (UNSC) embargo on trade in nuclear-capable missile technology with Iran, and the expiry of UNSC proliferation-related targeted financial sanctions on Iran.

The paper builds on existing academic literature, expert analysis and case studies relating to North Korea’s onward proliferation of nuclear and missile technology by considering how what is already known about North Korean transfers of nuclear and missile technology may have been – or may in the future be – impacted by some of the technological, economic and geopolitical developments outlined above and throughout the paper. Based on this analysis, the authors explore developments relevant to already-identified factors, as well as emerging ones, that shape whether Pyongyang may transfer its nuclear and missile technology, and what wares North Korea may transfer, and to which client states.

Existing Literature

While some previous work has considered North Korea’s onward proliferation, the literature is limited and much of it is more than a decade old. Much of the existing literature on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes has focused on developments in its nuclear and missile capabilities, Pyongyang’s revenue-raising efforts under sanctions, and its procurement of WMD and military technologies. More broadly, discussion of the threat posed by North Korea’s weapons programmes has focused on denuclearisation and (more recently) deterrence, rather than on the threat posed by onward proliferation.

The most insightful and in-depth work on North Korea’s onward proliferation was published by Joshua Pollack. In 2011, Pollack examined North Korea’s missile sales and how these had changed since what he called the “Golden Age” of North Korean missile exports in the 1980s. Pollack observed that Pyongyang had shifted – with some exceptions – from supplying complete missile systems to transferring parts, materials and expertise instead. He also noted that North Korea was moving its focus towards cooperation in joint missile development and production with a smaller number of countries – particularly Iran and Syria – as opposed to transferring full missiles to a range of customers. Pollack argued that these shifts stemmed from market saturation for North Korea’s missile offerings as a result of past missile transfers and requirements for components and maintenance services from past customers. He also attributed this shift to a deprioritisation of ballistic missiles among some potential customers, particularly in the Middle East, in favour of Western-supplied piloted aircraft, cruise missiles and missile defence systems, and pressure from the US to curtail engagement with North Korea. As the authors outline in this paper, some analogous factors appear to be impacting on more recent supply and demand drivers in North Korea’s onward proliferation.

Pollack also examined North Korea’s nuclear exports, arguing that Pyongyang seems to have prioritised technological exchange instead of currency generation in the limited number of known transfers of its nuclear technology. However, Pollack also argued that Pyongyang may seek to leverage its nuclear expertise and technology for revenue generation in the future. Naturally, his work relied on the data available to him over a decade ago; since then, additional cases and data points on North Korean missile and nuclear exports have afforded greater understanding. The present-day utility of other works in understanding the phenomenon of North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology has been even more limited by their age. Others studying North Korean onward proliferation have limited their study to discrete aspects, such as transfers to non-state actors, or China’s role.

This paper has also benefited from research on adjacent topics such as North Korea’s arms exports and sanctions evasion networks. Notably, in her 2016 book, Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers in the Sanctions Era, Andrea Berger identified a range of factors driving demand for North Korean military goods, considering customers in three categories: “resilient” customers with deep political and military ties to Pyongyang, “reluctant” customers with few other options in terms of suppliers, and less committed “ad hoc” customers. Berger’s work highlights the unique nature and context of specific relationships and their developments, which has helped to inform some of the analysis in this paper. Others have considered the role of specific entities in North Korean proliferation activities and procurement networks. However, no study in the past decade has revisited the question of North Korea’s onward missile and nuclear proliferation activities.

Key Arguments, Research Methodology and Structure

Given its growing technological offering and continuing need to generate hard currency, North Korea has significant incentives to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to other states. Surpluses created by technological advances may also be available for sale. However, despite clear incentives to proliferate, a range of factors that work to constrain North Korea’s sales are likely to prevent an all-out onward-proliferation bonanza. Many of these drivers and restraints, discussed in the literature, continue to shape North Korea’s onward proliferation activity.

Furthermore, the changing geopolitical landscape – particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – may provide new opportunities for North Korea. Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea may give other countries the green light to breach UN sanctions and accept North Korean arms, missile or even nuclear technology. There is a real risk that such developments could lead to a resurgence of the North Korean arms and missile export enterprise.

In re-examining the topic and building on others’ work, the authors were able to consider a wider range of data, as new material has become available over the past decade. Part of the reason for limited research on North Korean onward proliferation is the methodological challenge inherent in the study of Pyongyang’s proliferation activities. The extreme opacity of the North Korean economy, its regime and policymaking process makes the country a challenging target for researchers. Like any other country, North Korea guards the details of its military programmes – including procurement, technological developments and exports – particularly closely, making the study of its nuclear and missile matters especially difficult. Partial data on specific cases most often becomes available with a significant time lag, following interdictions of technology, the discovery of major proliferation rings such as the AQ Khan network, or in reports on the movement of North Korean technicians to customer states.

More data on North Korean missile and nuclear developments and transfers is available than ever before. The UNSCR 1718 PoE has produced almost 20 detailed public reports since it was established in 2009, rich in details on North Korea’s sanctions evasion activities and illicit networks. Pollack’s work was largely unable to benefit from this data, which has provided insights into North Korea’s missile relationships with Egypt, Iran and Syria, as well as its dual-use technology exports. Increased access to open source data by investigative journalists, think tank analysts and academics has also led to the proliferation of analysis on NorthKorean capabilities and sanctions evasion.

The authors have supplemented the information available in public sources with 20 semi-structured interviews conducted with experts through video conferencing and in person in London between June and early August 2023. Interviewees included former government officials and former members of the UNSCR 1718 PoE, as well as academics and other researchers working on matters related to North Korea’s nuclear, missile and broader military programmes, North Korean domestic, economic and security policies, and broader Asian security issues. Interview questions were tailored to each expert’s respective area of knowledge, but broadly focused on North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes, proliferation activities and networks, domestic and foreign policies, and international efforts to counter North Korean proliferation. The interviews allowed the authors to gauge current views on the state of North Korea’s onward proliferation enterprise and to test hypotheses as they were developed over the course of the research.

Given the methodological challenges in studying matters related to the North Korean missile and nuclear programmes, and the dearth of current data on the subject, interviewees often had to caveat their assessments, noting that they were based on limited data and assumptions and were thus speculative. Consequently, the authors extend the same disclaimer to the findings outlined in this paper. Nevertheless, common themes in interviewees’ assessments emerged and these were supported by further research, allowing the authors to confidently formulate their conclusions.

The authors’ analysis is presented across two main chapters. Chapter I considers recent developments in North Korea’s technological offering and assesses which technologies may be of interest to customers. Chapter II outlines the likely factors influencing North Korean decision-making on whether to transfer its nuclear and missile technology, and how these may have evolved in recent years. The paper concludes with 10 recommendations to address supply of and demand for North Korean missile and nuclear technology.

Box 1: North Korea’s Historical Missile Sales

North Korea has long acted as an exporter of ballistic missile technology – particularly SRBM systems. According to one estimate, North Korean supply made up around 40% of the ballistic missiles supplied to the developing world between 1987 and 2009; more than 500 missile systems in total.

The genesis of North Korea’s own missile programme was the transfer of Soviet-design Scud SRBMs from Egypt in the 1980s. North Korea in turn supplied the Scud system – and related components – to a wide range of customers, many based in the Middle East. This included Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and the UAE. North Korea also transferred Scud missile technology to Myanmar and Vietnam in East Asia.

Pyongyang transferred Nodong MRBMs, a scaled-up version of the Scud SRBM, to Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s. Both states’ programmes have advanced far beyond this early North Korean assistance – as is the case for a number of North Korea’s earlier customers.

North Korea has also transferred IRBM technology to Iran and has allegedly offered IRBMs to private arms dealers in the past.

Box 2: North Korea’s Historical Nuclear Sales

The authors are aware of just four cases in the public domain of North Korean transfers of technology pertaining directly to nuclear weapons capabilities, from the 1990s to 2016.

• Nuclear trigger technology to Pakistan. North Korean technicians assisted Pakistani weapons scientists in producing krytrons – components used to trigger a nuclear device – in the mid-1990s. This was part of a series of technological deals between the two states, with Pakistan receiving complete missiles and parts from North Korea, as well as North Korea receiving centrifuge technology, and its technicians training in Pakistani facilities.

• Uranium gas to Libya. In December 2003, after the revelation that Libya was purchasing a centrifuge enrichment plant from the AQ Khan proliferation network, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in the country were shown three mystery cylinders of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a uranium gas that is fed into the centrifuges during the enrichment process. US analysis of contamination on the outside of the cylinders showed that they had originated in North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre. The IAEA later stated that the 1.7-tonne shipment was the first of a larger planned series of transfers of 20 tonnes between North Korea and Libya brokered by Khan.

• A reactor for Syria. North Korea worked with Syria to construct a nuclear reactor near Al-Kibar in Syria between the late 1990s and 2007 (when the site was bombed by Israeli aircraft). The reactor – the most extensive example of North Korea’s nuclear exports in the public domain – was a smaller-scale version of North Korea’s 5-megawatt (MW) graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon. Intelligence reports suggested that the reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium for one or two weapons annually, had it been fuelled or gone critical.

• Sale of thermonuclear weapon isotope online. In 2016, an open source investigation revealed an advertisement for lithium-6. Lithium-6 is an isotope that can be used in thermonuclear weapons – either directly, or by irradiating it in a reactor to produce tritium. The advert was posted openly on a business-to-business (B2B) website and listed a phone number linked to the North Korean embassy in Beijing.

I. North Korea’s Current Technological Offerings

North Korea has acquired and developed – and therefore could potentially export – a wide range of missile and nuclear technologies. This potential technological offering has expanded over the past decade as North Korea has advanced its missile and nuclear capabilities – both indigenously and through acquisition of technology from other countries. While the offering has expanded, the fundamental range of options for transfer has not changed, and includes everything from fuel cycle facilities and complete missile systems to capabilities for building these facilities, individual dual-use goods and components, as well as expertise relating to elements of missile production, and to the nuclear fuel cycle or to weaponisation. Table 1 summarises some of the main types of transfers North Korea could consider (there is evidence of past exports across all these categories, except for the transfer of complete nuclear warheads).

North Korea’s developments in nuclear and missile technology over the past decade could have a dual effect on its supply of technology. First, newly developed capabilities – which are more attractive to a wider range of customers – could be transferred. Second, the replacement of older designs and systems with newer, higher-quality or more capable ones could create surpluses of older systems, goods and expertise that could be exported. These surplus items may be appealing to a different subset of customers – those with less ability to absorb technology, lower capability needs, limited budgets or perhaps similar older systems in need of spare parts or interoperable systems. At the same time, North Korea’s expanding catalogue of missile systems and nuclear capabilities raises the question of whether it could now consider a sub-set of this catalogue of technologies to be too strategically important for its own security for them to be transferred to customers abroad. These security concerns are explored further in Chapter II.

▲ Table 1: North Korea’s Potential Missile and Nuclear-Related Offerings. Source: Author generated.

Missile Technology Offerings

Historically, North Korea has mostly exported short-range, and sometimes medium-range, ballistic missiles. Could recent developments in its short-, medium- and longer-range ballistic missiles create new sales opportunities?

Developments in SRBM and MRBM Capabilities

North Korea has debuted a series of solid-fuelled SRBMs since 2018. Although the exact specifications of the systems – some of which have multiple variants – are unclear, they will likely replace the liquid-fuelled Scuds and Tochka-type systems in North Korea’s arsenal, and potentially also in its sales catalogue.

North Korea first revealed the KN-23 solid-fuelled SRBM during a 2019 parade. Since then, several variants have been developed, including smaller shorter-range and larger longer-range versions. KN-23 variants have been developed for deployment on a variety of platforms, such as road mobile transportable erector launchers, underground silos, railcars, submarines and underwater silos. The KN-24 – another solid-fuelled SRBM, with a range of around 400 km – was also unveiled in 2019. A further 2019 debut, the KN-25, is a solid-fuelled system described in North Korean media as a “super-large multiple rocket launcher”. It has four launch tubes on each launcher, and a range of up to 380 km.

These newer solid propellant missile systems could appeal to customers for several reasons. Beyond their quicker time to launch, solid-fuelled systems are easier to operate than liquid-fuelled ones (which require greater expertise for maintenance and handling of highly explosive, corrosive and toxic fuels). Older liquid-fuelled systems also require the procurement of a range of support vehicles and handling facilities – increasing the human and financial investment required. North Korea has also recently shown signs of exploring ampulisation technology – a set of measures to ensure maintenance of liquid-fuelled missiles in combat readiness for longer periods of time. This could both make a more appealing product, overcoming some of the shortcomings of liquid-fuelled systems, and see North Korea find ways to reduce the maintenance burden and investment required by customers for liquid-fuelled products.

Developments in IRBM and ICBM Capabilities

North Korean advances in missile technology that have received the most media attention relate to the country’s long-range systems, such as IRBMs and ICBMs. This includes the KN-17 IRBM, successfully tested in 2017; the KN-26 medium- range submarine-launched ballistic missile, successfully tested in 2019; the KN-28 (Hwasong-17) ICBM, successfully tested in 2022; and, most recently, the Hwasong-18. The latter, debuted in February 2023 and successfully tested in April, is North Korea’s first solid propellant ICBM – a significant development in its strategic capabilities.

Some have suggested that Pyongyang may consider transferring some of its longer-range missile systems to customers abroad. Indeed, North Korea did transfer IRBMs to Iran, which were likely based on imported Soviet missile technology. However, the strategic significance of these systems to North Korea’s own defence – and the insights they could betray into North Korea’s technology (including the state of its missile capabilities and domestic production capability, or reliance on foreign components) – may disincentivise Pyongyang from transferring them to others. The strategic importance that North Korea places on its missile capabilities, as well as the limited opportunities for intelligence collection on these systems by external actors, may make Pyongyang sensitive about having these capabilities fall into the hands of an adversary. Similar considerations could be applied to the Hwasong-8 carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle, which – while being an SRBM – has strategic significance for Pyongyang that could make transfer less likely. Although, as some of the experts interviewed for this project noted, any missile technology might be for sale for the right price, and Pyongyang may not care about its technology being intercepted provided it has received payment from the customer. These competing security and economic considerations are discussed in more detail in Chapter II.

The potential customer base for longer-range missile systems is also limited. There are few countries that would benefit from an ICBM capability (which suggests the need to hold at risk an adversary further than 5,500 km away) who have not already shown some interest in developing these systems domestically. The relationship between ICBMs and nuclear weapons, in which one technology often necessitates the development of the other to have strategic value, also reduces any potential customer base. Iran may be the most obvious exception, and would likely benefit from further collaboration with North Korea on long-range missile technology (albeit probably without the transfer of complete long-range missile systems), and is a case discussed further below and in Chapter II.

Potential for Surplus Sales

There is also a risk that North Korea may export surplus older systems, notably those based on liquid-fuelled Scud or Nodong technology that are likely being replaced (or may be in future) by newer solid-fuelled systems. North Korea used to frequently parade these missiles, but a system based on Scud or Nodong technology has not appeared in a parade since 2017. The KN-02, an early North Korean-manufactured version of the solid-fuelled Soviet OTR-21 Tochka missile, which was first unveiled in 2007, has also not been paraded since 2012.

While it remains unclear how many newer systems North Korea has been able to deploy, the apparent phasing out of older missile models raises questions as to what might have happened to these older systems, and whether surpluses could be for sale. Arms marketing material of unclear veracity handed over in the 2020 undercover documentary film The Mole included Scud C and Nodong (marketed as Scud E) systems and supporting vehicles allegedly for sale, as well as a system described as “Tochika-U”, likely the KN-02.

Surplus missile technology – including full missile systems, spare parts or components – may appeal to customers still operating Scud- or Tochka-type systems (see Table 2). However, this group of states is declining in size, with the returns of maintaining such aged technology diminishing, if not already non-existent – particularly if states have access to more modern options in the form of more advanced missiles or UAVs. The two states that received North Korean Nodong-type missiles in the 1990s, Iran and Pakistan, both indigenised the technology and have since progressed in their own programmes, although surplus Nodong-type systems could potentially be of interest to new customers.

▲ Table 2: States Holding Scud and Tochka Technology. Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2023) and a survey of other open source information. Note: Current data is difficult to compile – but inclusion in this table suggests that there is either evidence these countries currently operate these systems, or little evidence to suggest that the capability has been retired.

Surpluses created by the superseding of North Korea’s Scud fleet could lead to parts being available for sale. Evidence of North Korean trade in spare parts for these older systems, though, is dated. A 2013 shipment of Scud parts originating in North Korea, including connectors, relays, voltage circuit breakers and a barometric switch, was interdicted en route to Egypt from Beijing. North Korean markings were visible on two of the items – suggesting manufacture in North Korea. Egypt has continued to maintain and operate Scud systems, and it is not out of the question that more recent (and successful) shipments of spare parts and components have occurred.

North Korea may have other uses for its surplus missiles besides sales – including recycling, cannibalising them for materials, parts or components, mothballing them for future contingencies, or launching them in provocations. The war in Ukraine may also yield lessons. As one interviewee pointed out, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the continued value of short-range systems on the battlefield, and this may lead North Korea to retain older systems in great numbers for future contingencies.

Collaboration in Missile Development

Due to the sanctions environment and an evolving customer base, North Korea’s missile proliferation behaviour has largely adapted from the shipment of full systems towards the provision of spare parts, materials and technical support. As an unnamed UN member state noted to the UN PoE in 2019, “Instead of exporting full missile systems, the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) is sending technicians to a buyer country and establishing a complete supply chain”, noting that this pattern had been seen in Egypt, Iran and Syria.

Missile collaboration with Syria has been ongoing for many years. North Korean technicians were reportedly involved in the upgrade of the Scud D to create a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle in 2008. A delegation of Syrian engineers allegedly spent six years in North Korea from 2011 to 2017, and further exchanges took place around 2016, with a group of North Korean missile technicians staying on a Syrian airbase. North Korea has also supplied missile-related components to Syria as part of its collaboration with the country. Five containers of commercial items (many with applications in Scud missiles) originating in Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Denmark, Japan and the US were seized by an unnamed state while being shipped to Syria from Dalian, China in 2014. The PoE also noted in 2015 and 2016 that a Syria-based official from North Korean arms exporter Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) imported ball bearings and fibre optic cables, as well as bringing in three North Korean technicians.

North Korea’s missile collaboration with Iran has involved higher-end missile technology, given that Iran has a large (and expanding) missile industrial base and export capability of its own. Collaboration with Iran has not always been smooth sailing, with trust levels taking a significant hit after North Korea supplied the BM-25 Musudan IRBM, a missile with significant technical issues. US information suggests that over recent years there has been further collaboration on technology that is potentially of use in longer-range systems.

A 2016 sanctions notice suggested that North Korean technicians were collaborating with Iranians on an “80-ton rocket booster” being developed by North Korea. The notice stated that Iranian technicians from liquid-fuel missile producer SHIG travelled to North Korea for this purpose and named individuals who had travelled to Pyongyang for “contract negotiations”. It also suggested that KOMID had made shipments of missile-related goods to Iran, including “valves, electronics and measuring equipment suitable for use in ground testing of liquid propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles”. Further information on this collaboration was included in a 2021 UN PoE report, which noted that North Korea and Iran had “resumed cooperation on long-range missile development projects”, with the report focusing in particular on the development of a space launch vehicle (SLV). This collaboration included the “transfer of critical parts” and 13 North Koreans were named who had travelled to Iran to support KOMID’s work. The report also noted the high level at which such engagement was signed off within Iran, naming senior SHIG and Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) officials, and noting that the current director of AIO was a “key player in negotiations” when he had been the SHIG director.

Nuclear Technology Offerings

Short of the transfer of a complete warhead – something that all experts interviewed for this paper suggested was highly unlikely – there is a range of other nuclear-related technologies that North Korea could transfer. For instance, Pyongyang could sell nuclear material or isotopes, with a range of options short of weapons-usable fissile material. However – beyond the transfer of dual-use technologies with applications relevant to the production of nuclear weapons – the transfer of nuclear-weapons-relevant technology, nuclear material and other relevant isotopes was judged relatively unlikely by experts interviewed for this paper, for a number of reasons outlined further below. Nevertheless, previous North Korean transfers of nuclear technology – including reactor technology, nuclear materials, and even weaponisation technology (see Box 2) – suggest that the possibility for future transfers exists.

While US government assessments have suggested that North Korea likely has an arsenal of “up to 60 nuclear warheads”, there are significant gaps in public knowledge about the state of its programme and stockpile. Early attention to North Korea’s nuclear programme focused on the plutonium aspects of the fuel cycle and the 5-MW reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre. While it was suspected that North Korea may have uranium enrichment capabilities, the plutonium programme was, for a long time, the only publicly known North Korean nuclear weapons pathway. This changed in 2010, when a US delegation, including former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker, was shown a centrifuge facility at Yongbyon. There have been no further public reports of foreign access to North Korea’s nuclear facilities since.

Uncertainty persists regarding other potential enrichment facilities, the numbers and types of centrifuges North Korea may be deploying, and many other details about its uranium and plutonium fuel cycles and weaponisation processes. The limited number of recently seized shipments of goods or materials destined for North Korea’s centrifuge programme or other parts of the country’s nuclear weapons programme also restricts public understanding of the programme and how its recent development may have shaped North Korean nuclear wares available for sale.

Reactor and Enrichment Technology

Although North Korea has shown a willingness to transfer reactor technology in the past – namely, in its provision of assistance and materials for the construction of the Al-Kibar reactor in Syria – it would be incredibly risky for North Korea and any potential customers to engage in a further reactor construction project. Any such project would be relatively easy for foreign intelligence agencies to detect using a variety of human, signals and technical means. Reactors are large construction projects that are visible in open source satellite imagery. Even if the reactor being constructed were relatively small (as in the case of Al-Kibar), and even if most of the necessary physical materials could be sourced overseas, the development of such a structure would almost certainly be noticed by various national intelligence agencies, the IAEA or even open source analysts using commercially available satellite imagery, drawing significant scrutiny. As in the Al-Kibar case, other intelligence sources – such as human and signals intelligence – would likely reveal any North Korean involvement.

Centrifuge enrichment technology perhaps offers greater opportunities for export, as demonstrated by the AQ Khan network’s sale of centrifuges and related technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya in the 1990s and 2000s. The transfer of centrifuge capabilities could range from a small number of machines with associated expertise to a full turnkey centrifuge facility, and could be harder to detect than the construction of a reactor, given that facilities can be constructed covertly underground and that they lack the distinctive visual signatures of a nuclear reactor. However, the construction or expansion of such facilities in past instances has also been monitored using open source satellite imagery in the context of North Korea, Iran and other states. Disassembled shipping – consisting of many shipments of largely benign-looking industrial goods and materials (as seen in some of Khan’s transfers of enrichment technology to Libya) – could also make detection difficult. However, greater awareness of the risks posed by the transfer of centrifuge technology among customs and intelligence agencies following the Khan case, as well as the enhanced ability of NGOs to collect and monitor data on illicit trade activity, could mean that multiple connected shipments would be detected more readily.

Limited knowledge of North Korea’s centrifuge technology makes it difficult to assess whether it has old surplus centrifuge models it may want to sell and/or whether it possesses newer technologies that are more appealing to customers. During his 2010 visit, Hecker observed a facility with around 2,000 machines that appeared to be based on the Pakistani P-2 centrifuge model, and fabricatedwith rotors made from “alloys containing iron” according to one North Koreanengineer – interpreted by Hecker to mean maraging steel. As some analysts have noted, that North Korea is still operating these P-2 type machines is “an assumption that should be treated with caution”. Indeed, a paper published by a North Korean scientist indicates at least some interest in more advanced models of centrifuges. Taking the Iranian nuclear programme as a point of comparison, Tehran has developed multiple generations and models of centrifuges in a similar time span. It would be reasonable to assume that North Korea could have made comparable progress. However, the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and the motivations behind it are different from those of North Korea: Iran is more focused on publicly displaying its technical capabilities and trying to create leverage in the context of diplomacy over its nuclear programme, while North Korea is likely focusing on improving the efficiency of its centrifuge technology to expand its fissile material stocks and nuclear arsenal, with no public communication aspect – at least for the time being.

Movement towards more advanced models would suggest that North Korea has developed domestic advanced centrifuge production capabilities and may indicate that there are fewer chokepoints for the sub-technologies required for production. Full centrifuges (whether more or less advanced) or constituent dual-use technologies (discussed further below) could both appeal to customers. However, the extreme secrecy surrounding this aspect of North Korea’s programme would make the practicalities of marketing and sharing this technology difficult and risky for North Korea, as the interdiction of shipments could provide significant insights into Pyongyang’s programme. Development of more advanced centrifuges could also create surpluses of older machines and spare parts – items that Khan’s network tried to provide to Iran and Libya, with mixed success.

Intangible Nuclear Transfers

Beyond the transfer of tangible enrichment or reprocessing technologies, North Korea may seek to capitalise on the export of intangibles – that is, expertise, skills and design information relevant to nuclear weapons development. Such an offering could certainly be useful for states looking to develop aspects of a nuclear fuel cycle or move towards a nuclear weapons capability. Transfer of intangibles could accompany tangible transfers, as was the case in Syria when North Korea deployed experts and transferred technology to construct the Al-Kibar reactor. It could also involve North Korea aiding other states in solving specific technical challenges, such as North Korean technicians’ support to Pakistan in producing krytrons in the 1990s (see Box 2).

The value of the different aspects of North Korea’s nuclear knowledge will ultimately be decided by Pyongyang’s prospective customers/partners, but the most useful and unique offering is likely to be North Korea’s tacit knowledge – the things that cannot easily be codified and transferred, and only learned by doing. This could include the experience of producing fissile materials through reactor operation and reprocessing, running an enrichment plant, or experience related to nuclear weapons design, testing and weaponisation (an even rarer area of expertise outside the nuclear weapons states). This sphere of knowledge might be of particular interest to Iran, a state that has mastered enrichment technology and may have an interest in pursuing a weapons capability in the future.

Dual-Use Technologies

Given that the level of monitoring of North Korea’s borders has risen, and the transfer of full missile systems or other large missile and nuclear-related technology has thus become riskier, North Korea is likely to look to export more innocuous dual-use technologies and materials – those that have both civilian and military applications. While North Korea likely relies on imports for a large proportion of the higher-end items for its WMD and military programmes (the so-called “chokepoint” technologies), as its programme has advanced, Pyongyang has undoubtedly indigenised the production of some dual-use components and materials, and may look to capitalise on these production abilities and any surpluses through onward sales. It may also look to act as a broker, leveraging its procurement networks around the world to source dual-use goods for customers, either for use directly by the customer or by North Korean technicians assisting in missile- and nuclear-related manufacturing and development projects.

While the transfer of dual-use items from North Korea would still violate UN sanctions, such transfers would be more inconspicuous than the movement of large missile and nuclear technologies. North Korean-manufactured goods could be laundered within the extensive legitimate global trade in dual-use technologies and would, if uncovered, be less politically contentious than full systems. Russian or Chinese markets provide extensive laundering opportunities which could be capitalised on with minimal risk, as Moscow and Beijing have historically turned a blind eye to North Korean sanctions violations. Online platforms – such as the Chinese B2B site used to market North Korean lithium-6 in 2016 (see Box 2) – could provide opportunities for the anonymous sale of technology, obfuscating obvious links to North Korea.

There is precedent for North Korean transfers of dual-use goods to countries that had previously purchased North Korean missile technology. For example, PoE reports note the interdiction in 2010 of a shipment of aluminium alloy rods, copper bars and brass discs to Syria, with the products likely originating in North Korea. A shipment of North Korean-origin graphite cylinders was also interdicted in 2013 en route to Syria. North Korea has also previously marketed its dual-use machine tools overseas. In 2013, the UN listed Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation – North Korea’s main machine tool producer – for its involvement in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes. As researchers noted in 2014, the company attended a trade fair in Dandong, China in 2013 and marketed machine tools in China and Russia under the names of “Millim Technology Company” and “Koryo Technologies” (or “KORTEC”), respectively.

II. Evolving Factors Influencing Supply and Demand

While technological developments in North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes help dictate what may be available for sale, a range of political, economic and security factors also play an important role in influencing both demand for – and North Korean willingness to supply – these technologies. This chapter explores in more detail what is likely to motivate and restrict both North Korea and its potential customers when it comes to engaging in missile and nuclear technology transfers. While the need to generate revenue remains a strong motivator for Pyongyang, demand for its wares has been progressively waning. This decline is the result of several factors, namely, changing technological needs and greater supplier choice among Pyongyang’s customers, as well as concerns over the quality of North Korean goods and the risk of interdiction. The chapter also maps out the changing sanctions context, and how Russia’s arms purchases from North Korea could undermine the sanctions regime and risk a resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.

Continued Need for Revenue Generation

As in the past, revenue generation remains a key incentive for North Korean missile technology transfers. North Korea’s economic troubles long predate the UN sanctions regime, with the country repeatedly defaulting on debt repayments from the 1970s onwards. The imposition from 2006 of increasingly expansive UNSC sanctions on the country’s economy exacerbated existing economic challenges, while more recent sectoral sanctions introduced in 2016 and 2017, and the border closures stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic, have put North Korea in an especially precarious economic situation. States are prohibited from virtually all economic engagement with the country, leaving it cash-strapped and desperate to seek out and exploit economic opportunities.

Precisely how much revenue North Korea has generated, or may be able to generate, through the sale of missiles or nuclear technology is challenging to ascertain. Public reporting on individual North Korean missile and nuclear transfers is extremely limited and very rarely includes data on the value of transactions. Furthermore, reported figures may not include estimates for the transfer of expertise, manufacturing facilities, or maintenance and support services. Some of the available figures unsurprisingly suggest that military transfers offer North Korea lucrative opportunities for revenue generation, with estimates – which are based on sources that are either unclear, dated and/or difficult to verify – citing figures in the hundreds of millions of US dollars.

Some examples provide insights into the revenue raised from individual transfers,transactions or weapons systems. While comparing the prices offered for ballistic missile systems is extremely challenging, a review of the prices of North Korean conventional weapons offerings supports the hypothesis that North Korean systems are generally cheaper than the alternatives. The prices offered in the 2020 documentary The Mole, and to British arms dealer Michael Ranger in a deal around a decade ago, suggest that North Korean arms are often offered at a price below the market rate of equivalent systems. This has historically made North Korean arms appealing to customers, particularly in the developing world.

The Mole saw marketing materials – including a price list for North Korean weapons systems – handed to an actor playing the role of an investor during a 2017 trip to Pyongyang. The price list included a cost breakdown for missiles with different types of warheads, launchers and associated handling vehicles. Missiles and vehicles were priced per unit and in quantities of five, three or two units. For example, Scud C missiles with high explosive warheads were offered for $2.795 million per unit, but sold in lots of five for $13.975 million, whereas Nodong missiles (termed Scud E for extended range) were offered for $4.94 million per unit and $24.7 million for five. While they are impossible to verify, such values are not outlandish compared to figures seen elsewhere. Sale of components and parts can also be lucrative: the PoE noted in 2015 and 2016 that a KOMID official based in Syria (with the rank of major general) shipped ball bearings and fibre optic cables, and brought in three North Korean technicians, earning over €100,000.

North Korea could potentially leverage more sensitive nuclear transfers for extensive profits far above the market rate, especially in situations where the customer has no alternatives. Illicit procurement networks often see intermediaries monetise the risk by charging a premium, and North Korea could do this through selling goods it has either produced or procured, as part of a package for customers. Analysis of the cost of the UF 6 sold to Libya through the Khan network in the early 2000s suggests that the three cylinders of 1.7 tonnes were sold for $2 million, the equivalent of 40 times the then market rate. Similarly, transfer of North Korea’s more advanced missile systems (or, more likely, related technology) such as its IRBM, ICBM or newer hypersonic technologies may offer particularly lucrative opportunities for revenue generation. However, as mentioned, Pyongyang may be reluctant to transfer some of these higher-end technologies to avoid betraying the details of its advanced systems and production capabilities to adversaries.

Despite the high risk, larger projects such as the construction of facilities could also garner significant sums. While of unclear veracity, media reporting from 2009 citing an Iranian defector and Israeli intelligence claimed that Iran financed Syria’s purchase of the Al-Kibar reactor from North Korea, paying Pyongyang between $1 billion and $2 billion for the project. The Khan network – and especially Khan’s Libya deal – saw the transfer of a 10,000-centrifuge plant for between $100 million and $200 million.

North Korean arms sales have also been heavily shaped by the financial incentives of North Korean arms trading company representatives – essentially, the salespeople – working overseas. These representatives are often accredited as diplomats, work out of embassies, and are entrepreneurial in building relationships and exploiting opportunities. Indeed, they are compelled to be entrepreneurial: North Korea’s overseas missions, including embassies, are believed to be self-funding, tasked with raising funds to sustain themselves and the regime back in Pyongyang. While the financial driver at this working level may manifest itself through arms sales, decisions to sell missiles and nuclear technology are likely far more sensitive, and almost certainly are taken in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, North Korean operatives abroad are likely to be under pressure to identify revenue-generating opportunities to decision-makers in Pyongyang, which may include potential deals for the transfer of missile or even nuclear technology.

There is also potential for North Korea to engage in barter trade as it has in the past, exchanging missile and nuclear technology, expertise and materials for other goods. Experts interviewed for this paper pointed to oil, grains and fertiliser as goods that North Korea may be especially interested in procuring in a barter arrangement. In the 2000s, the Myanmar government “gifted” rice to North Korea in exchange for “technical services and equipment”, which reportedly included conventional weapons. Recent reports have suggested that Moscow may offer Pyongyang food in exchange for munitions. Such barter arrangements allow North Korea to receive payment without needing to access the international financial system, while also accessing goods it is prohibited from (or may struggle in) procuring freely as a result of sanctions.

Transfers of the full missile and nuclear systems that are likely to prove most lucrative to North Korea have become riskier and more challenging due to increased global awareness of UNSC sanctions on North Korea, improved interdiction capabilities and expanded open source scrutiny of the country’s trade activities. This led some of the experts interviewed to ask whether Pyongyang would continue to pursue missile and nuclear transfers, or shift to less risky and easier to move commodities for revenue generation. North Korea’s increasing exploitation of cryptocurrency is one example of an alternative yet highly lucrative revenue-generation line, with cryptocurrency hacks allegedly generating $1.7 billion for North Korea in 2022.

Sales of more innocuous but still sanctioned goods and services – such as textiles or the export of construction labour and IT services – are also less risky sources of revenue. For instance, coal has historically been a major source of revenue for North Korea and has been directly linked to the financing of the country’s missile and nuclear programmes, although it may be seen by the broader international community as being less politically sensitive than trade in missile, nuclear or other military technology. However, North Korea’s desperate economic situation may mean that it does not have the luxury of choosing between revenue streams, and may instead require it to pursue all means available to raise funds.

Opportunities for Technology Barter

One form of barter trade which may be particularly attractive to North Korea is the exchange of its missile- or nuclear-related expertise and capabilities for that of other states, or engagement in collaborative missile and nuclear technology development. As mentioned earlier, striking deals which benefit North Korea technologically has long been at the core of the country’s proliferation deal-making. As Pollack has noted in his work on North Korea’s nuclear trade:

While the evidence is ambiguous, a careful examination suggests that many past transfers were actually done not for profit but in exchange for components or materials that benefited Pyongyang’s own nuclear program.

Of the three nuclear cases that Pollack examines (see the first three listed in Box 2), he noted that each potentially had a barter aspect to them. However, evidence is admittedly thin in places. For example, assisting Pakistan’s krytron development came after the transfer of centrifuge components, drawings and plans to North Korea; transfers of UF6 into the Khan network may have been repayment for Khan’s assistance to North Korea in producing it; and North Korea could potentially have benefited from plutonium produced in the Al-Kibar reactor.

As Pyongyang continues to develop its missile and nuclear programmes, exchanging complementary expertise or working on new advances in collaboration with partners will remain an attractive option, albeit one that likely has less necessity and more limited returns than in the past, given North Korea’s own recent technological successes in its nuclear and missile programmes. Priority areas for North Korea’s missile development – and for potential collaboration opportunities – are likely to include items outlined in the five-year plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021. These include improvements in missile accuracy up to a range of 15,000 km, improvements in solid fuel propulsion for submarine-launched and ground-based ICBMs, military reconnaissance satellites, and R&D in hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear-powered submarines and UAVs.

Given North Korea’s technological successes and the sanctions regime, there is now a smaller range of countries that could both offer technology the country could benefit from and, importantly, be willing to offer such technology in exchange for North Korean wares. An obvious candidate would be Iran, as it has made great leaps in its centrifuge and missile programmes over the past decade. One expert interviewed for the project also suggested that there may be room for cooperation between Iran and North Korea on hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia could be another candidate. Further North Korean arms transfers to Russia (potentially including ballistic missiles) could allow North Korea to request technology from Russia’s extensive WMD and other high-technology programmes – such as its space launch or submarine programmes – in return. Moscow’s willingness to provide such technologies, given its historical commitments to non-proliferation and its potential security concerns vis-à-vis a North Korea with more advanced missile and nuclear capabilities, are not a given, but recent engagement seems to suggest a potential willingness to cooperate (see Box 3).

Box 3: War in Ukraine and the Growing North Korea–Russia Technology Transfer Axis

Recent developments in North Korea’s relationship with Russia are concerning for the future of both non-proliferation efforts and the UN sanctions regime. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created a need for weaponry and materiel, as well as renewed efforts by an increasingly isolated Moscow to garner political support from a smaller range of allies and partners. Initial arms transfers of “infantry rockets and missiles” were allegedly made between North Korea and the Wagner Group in November 2022. More recently, research has suggested that hundreds of containers of weaponry – likely ammunition – have been transferred from North Korea to Russian military bases, while South Korean intelligence reported indications of North Korean ballistic missile transfers to Russia in early November 2023.

The potential for exchange of more advanced and strategically important technology is clear. In July 2023, Russian Defence Minister Shoigu was shown around an arms fair in Pyongyang by Kim Jong-un, where he viewed ICBMs, SRBMs, hypersonic missiles and UAVs. During Kim’s trip to Russia to meet Putin in September 2023, the Russian leader hosted his North Korean counterpart at Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome and noted North Korea’s interest in rocket and space technology. Media reports surrounding the meeting also suggested North Korea was interested in “advanced technology for satellites and nuclear-powered submarines”. Further details are yet to emerge. However, advances in missile technologies – including items identified in Pyongyang’s 2021 plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems – are also likely to be on North Korea’s wishlist for Moscow.

With these breaches of the arms embargo and possible movement towards breaches on the prohibition on transfers of other technologies, the future of the UN sanctions regime – which in some senses has been on life support for several years – is precarious. In September 2023, around the time of Kim’s visit, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov noted that sanctions were “adopted in a completely different geopolitical situation” and accused Western states of “lies” over humanitarian support. If Russia, a UNSC permanent member, so blatantly violates sanctions and is seen to use North Korean arms or missile systems in Ukraine, it may lead other states to look to North Korea for arms, and could potentially open the floodgates for further North Korean arms and missile sales.

Ideological and Foreign Policy Considerations

In the past, North Korea’s sales opportunities have been influenced – in part – by its broader foreign policy relationships and objectives, and vice versa. Pyongyang’s arms exports began during the Cold War, expanding significantly through the 1970s and 1980s, as North Korea built its military–industrial complex. Through its Cold War military sales, the country sought to demonstrate its commitment to the socialist cause, strengthen the capabilities of fellow members of the socialist bloc, and gain favour with Moscow and Beijing. Even during the Cold War, however, ideology was not the sole driver of North Korea’s military transfers, with the export of military technology and expertise being part of its broader efforts to consolidate relationships with developing countries around the world and compete with Seoul for influence.

Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has continued to do business and conclude cooperation agreements in a range of fields with a variety of countries, with no indication of any discrimination on ideological grounds or links to any known direct North Korean security interests. Unlike Iran, which has been known to transfer missiles to its proxies across the Middle East, North Korea does not have similar relationships with proxies on whom it might rely to achieve certain security objectives, and thus be incentivised to transfer capabilities to.

Recent geopolitical developments may create greater opportunities for North Korea to strengthen political ties through technology transfer. Russian arms purchases from, and growing engagement with, North Korea creates political benefits for Pyongyang. While new UN sanctions resolutions have been an unlikely prospect in recent years, with no agreement even on new entities to be added to the UN sanctions list, the relationship with Russia helps to bring North Korea out of its sanctions isolation. The apparent degradation of the international sanctions regime could also see a resurgence in what Berger describes as “reluctant” customers, as well as “ad hoc” ones. This could make other potential customers view relationships with North Korea involving arms transfers as acceptable, and could even give North Korea new opportunities to pursue such relationships alongside (and in support of) Russian activities in Africa, for example.

In short, these recent developments mean that North Korea has more to play for in pursuing its international relationships and in using technology to that end. However, there is no indication that ideological sympathies or diplomatic priorities are going to be the only or even the primary driver of North Korean sales of military technology abroad – including missile and nuclear technology. Rather, these considerations will serve as a facilitator for, and an additional benefit from, Pyongyang’s illicit trade, which will still likely be driven by opportunism and the need for revenue generation.

Sanctions, Transfer Environment and Risks of Interdiction

The risk of interdiction, sanctions and other punitive measures is a major disincentivising factor for most countries when it comes to engaging in missile, nuclear and most other trade with North Korea. As such, North Korea’s biggest customers for arms and missile technologies today largely fall within what Berger describes as the “resilient” group. These are customers that continue to engage in business with Pyongyang despite UNSC sanctions, driven by longstanding political and military ties or else similarly under international arms embargoes or otherwise isolated. Iran, Syria and potentially Myanmar (see Box 4) clearly fit this profile, as countries that have little to lose politically by engaging with North Korea, have historical ties with Pyongyang (including in the sphere of military cooperation), and which are themselves isolated and limited in their weapons procurement options. The benefit (or necessity) of doing business with North Korea outweighs the risk of further sanctions or other reprimands for these countries from the US, the UN or others, as their economies are already subject to sanctions. However, the actual demand for North Korean longer-range missile and/or nuclear technology from these countries is likely to be tempered by some of the other factors outlined in this paper – including absence of need for these more strategic technologies, perceived unreliability of North Korea as a supplier, and the availability of similar options from other isolated suppliers.

Box 4: Myanmar: A Relationship Renewed?

Myanmar is believed to have previously purchased ballistic missile technology from North Korea alongside a more extensive variety of other conventional weapons technology. However, the specifics of the transfers are opaque. In 2012, the US government noted that Myanmar had been a customer of North Korea’s missile programme, while a leaked Myanmar government report suggested that Burmese military representatives had visited a missile factory in North Korea capable of producing Scuds and likely Nodong missiles in 2008, alongside a range of other facilities in the country. A more recent, unconfirmed report notes that 20 North Korean missile technicians were in Myanmar until 2015, and – citing independent researchers based in the country – that missile cooperation has restarted between the two countries in the wake of the 2021 military coup.

Myanmar’s military regime has also been accused of nuclear weapons aspirations in the past, notably around 2010, centred around allegations by a defector who worked in Myanmar’s strategic industries – but these were largely discounted. Experts interviewed for this paper expressed scepticism that Myanmar would be interested in a nuclear weapons capability, noting the country’s pressing economic and internal security challenges. Past reports that Myanmar was interested in building a nuclear weapon have also been rejected by members of the US intelligence community and other experts. The fact that the Myanmar military’s primary concern is domestic armed insurgency also raises questions over the utility of procuring advanced missile capabilities or nuclear weapons technology from North Korea, although such capabilities could help the regime feel more secure against external invasion.

Moving large physical shipments to and from North Korea covertly (see Box 5) has become markedly more difficult amid an improved understanding of common sanctions-evasion practices, and in light of the ability of governments and non-governmental organisations over the past decade to scrutinise North Korea’s airports, ports and border crossings using satellite imagery, trade and corporate data, and other investigative resources. The border closures caused by the Covid-19 pandemic (see Box 6) and resultant reductions in trade have also made recent movements of goods easier to detect. Increased monitoring and the potential for interdiction has therefore raised the risks of undertaking transfers of missile and nuclear goods, as well as deploying North Korean technicians, from North Korea itself. In contexts where interdiction was not possible previously, ships believed to be carrying suspicious cargo for Pyongyang have been pursued by naval vessels and forced to return to North Korea.

Box 5: Evolving Means of Transfer

Historically, transfers of North Korean missiles were undertaken by state-connected air freight and shipping fleets. In large part, a shift away from the more obvious state-connected modes of transport towards commercial shipping has been observed since the mid-2000s. A 2021 PoE report, however, notes that state-owned shipping companies have continued to play a role. According to one unnamed UN member state, KOMID – which has been called North Korea’s “primary arms dealer” and main exporter of missile technology – has reportedly cooperated with Iran’s SHIG on shipment logistics, engaging in “shipments to Iran, using vessels belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and routinely operating non-stop voyages from one third country ports to Iran”.

Geography also determines the easiest shipment routes, with rail connections across the border between North Korea and Russia allegedly being used to move weapons to the Wagner Group in November 2022. Russia and China’s evolving stance on North Korean sanctions could make North Korea’s land borders important vectors for proliferation-sensitive exports. However, more recent arms transfers between North Korea and Russia seem to have involved initial shipments from the former to a Russian submarine base using Russian-flagged and military-connected cargo ships running a “shuttle” service with their automatic identification system (AIS) transponders turned off to avoid detection.

The challenging logistical environment will likely see North Korean proliferation networks continue to adapt. Pyongyang may seek to fulfil more of its contracts entirely outside its borders, establishing manufacturing facilities in client states – as it previously had in Namibia to produce conventional weapons, for example – or in third countries, and relying increasingly on the extensive procurement networks it has established, notably in China but also around the world, to source the necessary components and materials. There may also be fewer interdiction risks if North Korean exports continue to shift towards projects that combine tangible and intangible support. In these arrangements – as seen in missile relationships with Iran and Syria, and the Al-Kibar reactor project – North Korean operatives can procure goods for projects largely outside of North Korea, and exports from North Korea can be limited to specific goods and technicians.

The constraint that the sanctions environment is currently imposing on North Korea is contingent to a significant degree on Russia and China’s future actions, with the evolution of North Korea’s growing relationship with Russia being pivotal. However, several interviewed experts noted that China’s willingness to turn a blind eye to North Korea’s onward missile and nuclear proliferation is not likely to be unlimited, especially in cases where developments affect China’s national security interests. Beijing is a signatory to a range of non-proliferation agreements and has its own security interests that may be undermined by North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology transfers. For example, China’s clear interest in avoiding instability on the Korean peninsula, and particularly any proliferation actions by North Korea that might elicit a response from the US and its allies, could potentially lead Beijing to exert pressure on Pyongyang to prevent it from engaging in such transfers. However, the degree of influence that Beijing has over Pyongyang’s onward proliferation decision-making calculus is likely limited. Some analysts have argued that China’s interest in maintaining stability in Pyongyang actually makes Beijing reticent about applying political or economic pressure, unless the risks of inaction outweigh the costs (for example, in the instance of potential North Korean nuclear warhead or fissile material transfers). Ultimately, the degree of direct coordination between Beijing and Pyongyang on sensitive matters such as missile and nuclear transfers – which would likely take place at the highest levels – is very difficult to ascertain.

Box 6: The Covid-19 Pandemic

North Korea shut its borders to all passenger and commercial traffic at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. Satellite imagery in March 2020 showed North Korean ships being recalled to the country’s ports, while land crossings with China and Russia were closed and border fences, guard posts and patrol roads were reinforced and expanded. North Korea also stopped the rotation of diplomats from its missions abroad – as it likely also did with its missile and arms technicians and procurement operatives based overseas. The country, relatively isolated in normal times, closed itself off almost entirely from the rest of the world. In the second half of 2023, though, there were signs that the borders were starting to open up again. Movement through ports and land crossings increased, restrictions on some official travel eased in spring, and North Korean nationals abroad (including some workers) were allowed to return as of August 2023, with limited commercial flights restarting that same month.

It is difficult to definitively assess the impact of these restrictions on North Korea’s procurement efforts and the onward transfer of missile and nuclear technology from the country. It is reasonable to assume that transfers slowed significantly between early 2020 and 2023. Several experts interviewed for this paper pointed to the pandemic restrictions as a reason why they were sceptical that North Korea was actively exporting missile and nuclear technology. However, North Korean technicians based overseas were also likely stuck abroad in customer states and unable to return home. As the country begins to open its borders and resume trade, missile and nuclear technology transfers may become more likely – particularly given recent North Korean efforts to exhibit its wares, and amid the further disintegration of the UN sanctions consensus. The restrictions on trade and travel since 2020 have also further exacerbated the economic situation within North Korea, creating further pressure to generate revenue or source critical supplies like food from abroad, which may further incentivise the sale of missile and/or nuclear technology.

Security Concerns Over Advanced Deterrent Capabilities

Security concerns, paired with the challenging transfer environment, will likely make North Korea carefully consider the transfer of certain particularly strategically important systems and technologies. These sensitivities are likely to stem from the risk that transferred technologies or information surrounding them may fall into enemy hands, with negative impacts for North Korea’s own nuclear deterrent. For example, North Korea’s adversaries could gain valuable information about North Korean capabilities from seized shipments of nuclear or missile technologies, related goods and materials, or even wreckage recovered from the battlefield. Intelligence can be derived from seized technologies, providing insights into manufacturing, supply chains and capabilities.

Examination of interdicted missiles, or wreckage recovered after their use, may yield insights into North Korea’s manufacturing capabilities or the specific types of technology that it is importing to develop its programmes. This could allow North Korea’s adversaries to better counter the country’s illicit supply chains. Nuclear forensic techniques could provide insights into North Korea’s fuel cycle if North Korean fissile material or contaminated goods were seized in transit. Intelligence gained through examination of seized or recovered goods can also be used to construct countermeasures. This is a particular concern with regard to more modern ballistic missiles that might yield insights to inform developments in missile defence capabilities and arrangements by the US or its partners such as South Korea and Japan. The transfer of certain newer systems unique to North Korea would also reduce the prospect of potential plausible deniability of Pyongyang’s involvement in the transfer.

If North Korea is concerned about undermining its own security through transfers, this would lead to the development of two categories of systems. The first includes items that are core to North Korea’s security, and which would not be transferred: interviewees referred to these as the “crown jewels” or “top state secrets core to North Korea’s survivability”. This would include nuclear warheads and fissile material – which would be unlikely to be transferred for several reasons – as well as ICBMs and other missiles core to North Korea’s deterrent. The second category would include lower-level and older technology, which North Korea would be less concerned about transferring.

Chapter I explored some of the surplus technologies that may fall into this second category and discussed several reasons why North Korea may not be willing to transfer all of its older systems. A few further considerations may also follow from this security thesis. Reluctance to export newer systems and reveal information could lead to the development of export variants for the new SRBMs. However, this would require significant upfront investment from Pyongyang or its customers, which would be challenging in an environment with limited cash flow – which is exactly the situation in which North Korea and many of its historical and potential customers find themselves. It is also possible that if the design information of certain systems is compromised (for example, after wreckage is recovered after a test, or following a hack of the manufacturers), the security rationales against wider transfer for that particular system may be undermined, if concerns about the compromise of strategically important information on certain North Korean capabilities is indeed a consideration.

Changing Technologies and Markets

Technological developments may also restrict demand for North Korea’s missile offerings. Chapter I outlined the remaining (but shrinking) market for the Scud-and Tochka-like technologies that North Korea may have in surplus. Indeed, due to its extensive history of Scud exports and – in some cases – related manufacturing capabilities, North Korea may have reduced its appeal as a supplier to some customers that managed to absorb the technology. However, in the present day, North Korea’s missile sales also have to compete with newer technologies and suppliers.

For instance, militaries’ growing demand for UAVs is well documented. UAVs may be seen as a less expensive and more operationally appropriate system by some countries that would have previously sought short-range missiles. While UAV and SRBM capabilities differ significantly, including in their utility, the former may be well-suited – if not more desirable – for states without an active missile programme and in need of low-yield but high-precision capabilities to carry out limited and precise attacks in neighbouring countries or against factions on their own territories. UAVs are cheaper, more versatile, and easier to produce and transfer than ballistic missiles.

North Korea has shown some advances in its UAV programme, with drones penetrating South Korean airspace in recent years, and two large novel UAV systems shown to Shoigu in Pyongyang in July 2023. However, Iran’s capabilities for producing and exporting these systems are more advanced: Iran has well-established UAV capabilities and has exported drones to partners in the region and further afield. Critically, Iranian UAVs have now been extensively battle-tested – not only by Iranian proxies in the Middle East but also on a large scale by Russian forces in Ukraine. As such, past customers of North Korean SRBMs may now look to Iran as a UAV supplier instead. As Pollack noted, the 1991 Gulf War helped to shape missile markets, reducing interest in North Korean products as cruise missiles played a prominent role. Russia’s war on Ukraine could also affect potential North Korean missile markets, although extensive UAV and missile use makes it difficult to establish possible lessons at this stage.

Iran is also an established proliferator of missile technology, having exported missiles to proxies and partners in the Middle East. With the expiry of the UNSC embargo on nuclear-capable missiles and related technology trade with Iran in October 2023, Iran may seek to expand its customer base and thus pose competition for North Korea in securing new customers for its missile technology (although such trade with Iran is still sanctioned by the US, Europe and others).

Claims to Nuclear Responsibility

A final restraining factor – albeit one with unclear salience – consists of the non-proliferation norms that emerged after 1945, and North Korea’s notion of nuclear responsibility. The UN sanctions regime imposed on North Korea was, in some sense, an embodiment of these norms. Since acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, North Korea has repeatedly referred to itself as a “responsible nuclear power”, including in the context of onward nuclear proliferation. These are likely efforts by Pyongyang to normalise itself as a legitimate nuclear power outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – akin to the status enjoyed by Pakistan and India.

In an October 2006 statement, just days after North Korea’s first nuclear test and the subsequent UNSC resolution condemning it, North Korea’s foreign minister referred to the country as a “responsible nuclear weapons state [that] will never use nukes first and will not allow nuclear transfer”. These claims have most recently been codified in the September 2022 Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces (Section 10):

The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear weapons state, shall neither deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of other countries nor share them and not transfer nuclear weapons, technology and equipment concerned and weapon-grade nuclear substances.

Of course, the earnestness of these claims is unclear. By virtue of developing a nuclear weapons programme outside the recognised international non-proliferation framework – namely, the NPT – North Korea has already demonstrated its disregard for nuclear non-proliferation norms. Several experts interviewed for this paper also noted that North Korea has not offered any definition of what it means by “responsibility” in the nuclear non-proliferation context. However, the excerpt from the 2022 law could arguably be taken as a definition of what Pyongyang considers to be “responsible” behaviour by a nuclear power. Whether Pyongyang’s commitments can be taken at face value is debatable, but its past proliferation of nuclear technology after the 2006 statement should raise serious doubts. There is less of an international consensus regarding missile non-proliferation. North Korea has tended to deny allegations rather than make claims about responsibility when it comes to the transfer of missile systems.

Conclusion and Recommendations

With a growing technological offering and a persistent need to generate hard currency, North Korea still has significant incentives to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to foreign customers. It now has a wider range of more advanced missile and nuclear technologies than ever before, some of which may be available for sale to interested buyers. Pyongyang’s technological progress may also have created surpluses available for transfer, particularly Scud, Tochka and Nodong missiles, or even surplus or second-hand nuclear and dual-use technologies.

Despite these clear supply-side drivers, though, a range of factors work to constrain North Korea’s sales – particularly on the demand side of the equation – and these are likely to prevent an all-out onward-proliferation bonanza. The potential markets and customers for North Korean missile technology have been whittled down by a variety of factors, including North Korea’s assistance to customers in indigenising the technology it has sold, the emergence of competitors such as Iran, and the development of newer and more appealing technologies – namely, UAVs, but potentially also other suppliers and systems in future. The sanctions landscape and the unprecedented monitoring of the Korean peninsula also reduce sales opportunities and increase the risks of interdiction. Given Pyongyang’s recent technological advances, there may also now be only marginal returns on North Korean efforts to obtain technology for its own programmes through barter.

Concerns about putting its own deterrent at risk are also likely to temper North Korea’s willingness to export more advanced capabilities, despite the potentially lucrative price tag that could be attached to them. Offering these systems for sale is far riskier than peddling the Scud or even the Nodong systems that were based on well-understood and frugal 1960s Soviet missile technology. Insights gained from interdicted systems or those recovered from the battlefield after leaving North Korean control could do harm to North Korea’s national security. The export of such systems would increase the chances of them falling into adversaries’ hands, despite minimal recent large interdictions of North Korean military shipments.

In a continuation of some of the trends observed by Joshua Pollack in his work over a decade ago, the limited potential customer base, as well as a more challenging transfer environment, suggests that North Korea is most likely to continue engaging with established missile customers – those that Andrea Berger termed “resilient”, such as Iran or Syria. Future transfers are likely to involve dual-use components or intangible transfers of expertise rather than complete systems – because of limited demand and due to the greater chances of the latter being interdicted. North Korea’s extensive procurement networks outside its borders may also allow it to procure technology from third countries to transfer to customers, meaning that fewer direct shipments would be required. The ubiquity of largely anonymous online platforms may also help to identify potential customers and facilitate the sale of dual-use technology, despite the extensive international sanctions regime.

At the same time, the changing geopolitical landscape resulting from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine may bring new opportunities for North Korea. On the one hand, Pyongyang may benefit financially and technologically from technological exchanges with Russia. On the other, Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea and Moscow’s ability to veto further UNSC sanctions against Pyongyang or any of its future customers may give other countries the green light to accept North Korean missile and maybe even nuclear technology. The cover provided by Russia’s – and, to a less public extent, China’s – patronship of Pyongyang could lead to a significant change in North Korea’s fortunes as a supplier. Although only time will tell how the relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow develops, there remains a real risk of a broader collapse of the UN sanctions regime and the resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.

Building on the above analysis – and the clear need to pay attention to the issue – this paper presents 10 recommendations, organised into two sets, to help in countering North Korean missile and nuclear technology proliferation. The first set concerns efforts to deter and dissuade Pyongyang from engaging in onward proliferation – that is, they address the supply side of the equation. The second set addresses the demand side, suggesting ways to reduce North Korea’s customer base. The recommendations call for an approach that relies both on diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang and on harder measures that signal a willingness to disrupt and punish violations of sanctions and international non-proliferation norms.

Recommendations for Addressing Supply-Side Factors

Recommendation 1: Clearly message and demonstrate commitments to interdict, learn from and exploit North Korean missile and nuclear transfers. A concern that North Korea is likely to have over the transfer of its missile and nuclear technology – particularly more advanced or strategically significant systems – is the potential for that technology to fall into the hands of Pyongyang’s adversaries. This concern should be validated and leveraged. The US, the UK and their partners need to continue prioritising efforts at interdicting North Korean shipments of weapons technology, as per their UNSC obligations – either in transit or at their destination (for instance, in Ukraine, should Russia procure and use North Korean missiles in the future). They must also make clear that the technology will be inspected, shared with North Korea’s adversaries and used to help develop effective countermeasures, including missile defence. Outreach should also continue to be conducted on the relevant UNSC resolutions and through informal networks such as the signatory states to the Proliferation Security Initiative “Statement of Interdiction Principles”.

Recommendation 2: Bolster intelligence efforts, engage with allies and support open source researchers as force multipliers. Further bolstering intelligence collection to target potential North Korean procurement and export networks can help strengthen countermeasures across the board. The US, the UK, and Western and Asia-Pacific allies should ensure that the necessary processes are in place to allow for intelligence-sharing and collaboration in this sphere. They should ensure that new means to monitor potential intangible transfers (especially the movement of people such as technicians and engineers) are developed. This also includes greater exploitation of open source intelligence to further investigate North Korea’s relationships and monitor the internet for potential North Korean marketing of dual-use technologies on B2B websites. The lithium-6 and machine tool examples discussed above, as well as North Korea’s recent arms transfers to Russia, are all export or marketing activities that were uncovered by non-government researchers using open sources. Open source exploitation by non-governmental organisations can be a force multiplier when the intelligence community’s resources are stretched.

Recommendation 3: Strengthen counter-proliferation-financing efforts to weaken the revenue-generating potential of North Korean missile and nuclear transfers. Revenue generation is likely to be North Korea’s key driver for engaging in onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology. Continuing to invest in efforts to prevent Pyongyang from receiving or moving funds can help weaken that incentive. While North Korea may receive some payment by way of barter trade (not involving the formal financial system), targeting financial flows can impact how lucrative Pyongyang believes its proliferation activities to be. This should include continued awareness-raising of international and multilateral sanctions on North Korea, of standards and best practices for countering proliferation financing (CPF), and of common sanctions-evasion methods. National governments and international organisations engaged on CPF issues should prioritise sharing best practices and resources – for instance, model CPF legislation or lists of entities suspected of supporting North Korean proliferation financing (even if these are not sanctioned). While there have so far not been any known cases of North Korea using cryptocurrency as payment for proliferation-related transactions, Pyongyang is clearly transitioning its activities to the online space and has engaged extensively in crypto theft for revenue generation. Ensuring that CPF efforts keep up with these adaptations will be critical.

Recommendation 4: Include non-proliferation commitments in any nuclear negotiations with North Korea. Any future negotiations with North Korea on its nuclear programme should include commitments to international non-proliferation and nuclear security standards. Including an explicit commitment from North Korea to not transfer nuclear technology to other states – particularly with reference to the 2022 law on its policy on nuclear forces and clarifying North Korea’s definition of nuclear “responsibility” – as part of future negotiations could help positively reinforce any existing tendencies in Pyongyang to present itself as a responsible nuclear custodian. Such an approach, however, would require some level of recognition (even if tacit) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability – a proposition that is the subject of much debate within the expert community.

Recommendation 5: Engage with China on preventing North Korea’s onward proliferation, including by highlighting implications for Chinese interests and security. China has been a key facilitator for North Korean sanctions-evasion activity and likely has at least some, albeit limited, influence on Pyongyang’s decision-making in relation to onward proliferation. Engaging with China on the issue may therefore yield some benefit, especially if Beijing can be convinced to curtail Pyongyang’s access to transhipment routes, as well as financial and corporate infrastructure. To be sure, the likelihood of this approach’s success is dubious, as Chinese interests and security concerns diverge significantly from those of the US, Europe and other East Asian countries concerned with North Korean proliferation. In fact, creating instability in certain parts of East Asia might be in China’s interest if such instability were to absorb US resources and attention. There may be potential to incentivise Chinese cooperation, including through appeals to Beijing’s desire to be seen as a responsible nuclear power, as well as through continued identification and sanctioning of Chinese entities involved in supporting North Korean sanctions evasion. Taking a transactional approach may be another possibility – linking US openness to addressing issues of Chinese concern with Chinese willingness to prevent – or at least not support – North Korean onward proliferation activity. However, the currently limited state of dialogue between the US and China, as well as other issues such as the tension over semiconductor export controls and the issue of Taiwan, will make having an impact in this regard challenging.

Recommendations for Addressing Demand-Side Factors

Recommendation 6: Double down on counter-proliferation messaging and support. If indications emerge that North Korea’s onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology is starting to ramp up again, the US and its partners should consider making a clear statement that buyers of North Korean arms, missiles or nuclear technology will be heavily punished with sanctions and other tools. This messaging should, among other things, make clear that states purchasing North Korean technology will be cut off from Western technology across the board, and that they will be made subject to unilateral sanctions and other measures. Messaging should also continue to include the broader implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea. A tailored approach should acknowledge that some states may not perceive engagement with North Korea as problematic – despite international prohibitions to this end – and may actually be sympathetic to supporting the growing camp of anti-Western countries, or may be ambivalent about condemning or countering the behaviour of these anti-Western countries. As such, providing incentives to these countries to comply with their international obligations – whether through appealing to their standing as responsible members of the international community or by offering economic or other support – may be necessary. A combined “carrot and stick” approach is likely to be most effective.

Recommendation 7: Consider offering alternatives to North Korean missile technology. Following Recommendation 6, the US and its partners should consider offering alternative technologies or other incentives to potential customers when possible. Some states that seek to source missile capabilities from North Korea might do so because they lack – or cannot afford – alternative technologies or suppliers. As part of a targeted approach, the US and its allies should consider whether helping such states find alternative missile technology suppliers may be possible, without compounding the global proliferation problem or exacerbating situations of insecurity. Offering alternative sources of nuclear technology is, of course, a lot more problematic. In these instances, interested governments may be able to engage with countries on other strategic issues to identify drivers for the desire to acquire nuclear technology and identify possible solutions to addressing these concerns.

Recommendation 8: Target demand-side countermeasures to specific customers and prioritise engagement with those that are most likely to be receptive. At the same time, the US and its partners should prioritise engagement with countries that are likely to be most receptive to being dissuaded from engaging in trade with Pyongyang, and tailor approaches to individual potential customers. Trying to prevent missile transfers between North Korea and states that have had long-term missile cooperation partnerships with Pyongyang or which are themselves already subject to sanctions – the likes of Iran and Syria – through diplomatic engagement or threats is unlikely to bear fruit. Offering alternative suppliers in these instances is also not an option.

Recommendation 9: Make North Korea an unreliable supplier and technical partner. Countries interested in preventing North Korea’s onward proliferation should commit to efforts to making Pyongyang an untrustworthy supplier and partner for technical collaboration. As mentioned earlier in relation to Iranian reservations about the dependability of North Korean missile systems, sowing such mistrust can help discourage future purchases from – or collaboration with – Pyongyang. This should include increasing efforts to interdict shipments of weapons and materials, and could also include attempts to target North Korea’s procurement networks operating overseas, using some of the established extraterritorial tools targeted at customers’ programmes. Efforts could also be made to try to insert compromised technology into North Korea’s procure-to-supply networks, thus further undermining the credibility and reliability of North Korea as a supplier. Countries that are important suppliers of key technologies that North Korea may need for its missile and nuclear wares – namely, countries in North America, Europe and Asia – can play an important role in efforts to prevent North Korean procurement.

Recommendation 10: Carefully utilise unilateral counter-proliferation tools. While the current political dynamics on the UNSC will likely preclude any further UNSC sanctions against North Korea (or its facilitators or customers) in the foreseeable future, individual governments should continue to sanction North Korean and related entities that facilitate North Korean proliferation, or target them with other unilateral tools. While unilateral sanctions technically create no obligations for compliance by entities outside the relevant country’s jurisdiction, their appearance on sanctions lists will – or at least should – trigger adverse media and other compliance-screening measures at financial institutions or companies proactively seeking to comply with export controls. In the case of the US in particular, the importance of its financial sector and the US dollar to global markets means that many financial institutions around the world screen against US sanctions lists even if they are under no domestic obligation to comply with them. Such designations can also help facilitate open source investigations or the sanctioning of these entities in other jurisdictions. Use of other elements of the unilateral toolset developed and deployed by the US in recent years – which includes civil asset forfeiture as well as other targeted efforts against specific entities overseas – may also be appropriate in certain cases. However, application of these powerful tools should be considered on a case-by-case basis due to the risks of political blowback.

Daniel Salisbury is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking a three-year research project on arms embargos as part of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.

Darya Dolzikova is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern. Her research areas include the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, as well as other issues concerning nuclear technology and proliferation.